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Pages 1 - 24
                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Before The Honorable Jon S. Tigar, Judge
MARIE GAUDIN, individually,
and on behalf of others
similarly situated,
          Plaintiff,
                              ) NO. C 11-01663 JST
 VS.
SAXON MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC., )
a Texas corporation, and Does
1-100,
                              ) San Francisco, California
          Defendants.
                              ) Thursday, June 20, 2013
                  TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
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THE CLERK: Calling Civil Case 11-1663, Marie Gaudin versus Saxon Mortgage Services, Incorporated. Counsel, will you please make your appearance for the record? MR. FREDMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Peter Fredman, for the plaintiff and moving party, Marie Gaudin. MS. ABOU-RAHME: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Laila Abou-Rahme, on behalf of Saxon Mortgage Services. THE COURT: Welcome. Okay. We have a whole lot of interesting cases this afternoon, including this one. I don't know that I have so much -- I've only brought out some of my notes; I apologize. I don't know that I have so much to tell you, by way of a tentative. Let me just make a few points, though, before you arque. There's lots of discussion from the plaintiffs about what the common questions are, but in the commonality section of the briefs what is said on that subject is the common question is, quote, "Everyone in the class entered into the same TPP with Saxon, and made at least three trial payments it called for, but did not obtain the loan modification." That seems more like a class definition to me, as opposed to a question; a common question. The common question, though, actually permeates the briefs. I mean, the common question that I think plaintiffs want there

to be permeates those briefs; and that is whether, once the TPP

has been fully executed by both sides, it becomes an enforceable contract. As far as I can tell, that's what they want the common question to be.

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And if the answer is "No," then all of the class members lose.

And if the question is answered affirmatively, then, you know, maybe something else happens.

So that's a minor point in some ways; but you can't get to the question of commonality or typicality, unless I can confirm that that's what you think the common question is, even if you agree with the way plaintiffs think the TPP worked in the HAMP process, and all that. So plaintiffs would say, "You don't get to individualized HAMP inquiry, because the TPP was self-enclosed."

Even if the Court adopted that position, about 10 percent of potential class members fall out, because there were TPP criteria that were not met. And there is a little percentage chart which I didn't bring with me, but I have a list of the criteria, because for one of them, it's, you know, 1 percent; for one of them, it's 9 percent; for some, it's none. And I don't have those percentages right in front of me, but for example, one person -- I think I want to say it's one person -- wasn't able to show that they were in default, or the default was imminent; that sort of thing.

So my question for the plaintiffs is: Even if the Court

sees it your way about the TPP, don't those 10 percent make it difficult to certify that class? Mightn't I actually just not have a class that includes those people?

And then I know we don't have that much time. Probably something with a little more meat on it is: I want to understand all the remedies that the plaintiffs think this class is entitled to, particularly contractual damages; but in general, I don't have it clear in my mind what you think the remedies are that these class members would be entitled to, if the class is certified and if they prevail.

I apologize to the defendants. I wish I had more questions for you.

I'll let the plaintiff argue first.

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MR. FREDMAN: Your Honor, I think the common question is interpretation of the TPP as a contract, and also as a communication. Even if the TPP is not a contract, the act of signing it and sending it to the class members is deceptive, because they're going to think it's a contract. They're going to think it says what it does appear to say, which is: If you make these three payments, you're going to get this loan modification. So that's the common question; the predominant common question that predominates everything.

What does this document mean? Once Saxon signs it and returns it, is it a contract? Is it an enforceable contract; and even if it's not, is it deceptive, under the Rosenthal Act?

Is it misrepresenting something under the UCL? Those are common questions.

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So I don't think we can limit it to the question of whether it's an enforceable contract, both -- but it is -- it does still off all flow from looking at that one document, and interpreting it; construing it under the various legal theories that have been presented to you.

With respect to the 9 percent -- the TPP criteria -there -- I spotted one area where they said a certain number of
people were offered the loan modifications, and refused them.

And the class definition should be modified to exclude that.

And that can be done with a single word. And it doesn't really
affect the numbers very much. It's a very small percentage.

Other than that, you need to interpret the TPP document, as a contract or otherwise, before you can say that these

9 percent people, themselves, were in breach of the TPP, or were not legitimately --

THE COURT: Well, let's take the example of the one person or the one applicant who was not in default or was not able to show -- I think this is close to the language that default was imminent. Do you have that person in mind? Do you have that fact in mind?

MR. FREDMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: So how could that person possibly claim that there was a valid or binding contract, when that

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applicant, by the terms of the TPP, was not able to meet a necessary precondition to performance? And how can that person claim that they're -- that they were misled, when I'm assuming there has to be some element of reasonable reliance? How could they reasonably have relied? They didn't qualify for the program.

MR. FREDMAN: I don't disagree with that.

That's one person.

THE COURT: So let's throw them out of the class, then, because even their lawyer -- their putative class lawyer -- agrees they shouldn't be in the class. And then we can move to the other criteria.

I guess the Court would benefit from hearing from you why, as a matter of class-action management, if nothing else, these 10 percent should be in there.

MR. FREDMAN: For that one person, because it's one person, I think that person should remain in the class.

So we can take a little bit more detailed look at Saxon's basis for concluding there was no imminent risk of default.

THE COURT: All right. Let's take the 9 percent of people, because that will change the metrics.

This is from your brief at page 12: The 9 percent of class members who did not receive modifications, because they didn't submit all of the required information.

MR. FREDMAN: I think they're --

1 **THE COURT:** Are they entitled to a remedy? MR. FREDMAN: We need to -- with respect to that, 2 3 first of all, there's an interpretation of that provision in the TPP that needs to be undertaken, because the TPP -- the 4 5 process it describes is: I'm sending you the TPP signed by me, 6 my first check, and my tax returns with the package. And when 7 you send it back to me, you're telling me you've got enough information. 8 9 What -- as I read that provision, 1(d), it says: providing or already have provided documentation for all the 10 income that I've received. 11 To me, it's a verification that they're truthfully 12 disclosing all of their income, and not some kind of ongoing 13 obligation to keep providing documents whenever Saxon asks for 14 more documents. 15 And remember. These people are being -- average length is 16 10.5 months of being in this contract that's supposed to last 3 17 months; and you're supposed to get an answer in 1 month. 18 So --THE COURT: You agree Saxon doesn't later have the 19 20 right to toss them out of the program --21 MR. FREDMAN: No. 22 THE COURT: -- if they complied with the TPP, because 23 they determined that whatever was sent to them was inadequate? 24 MR. FREDMAN: Yes. Exactly. I mean, and there may be some more granular detail, all of 25

which is available in the loan data, that enhances our understanding; but it's all going to start with the Court's interpretation of that provision. Does that provision create an ongoing right for Saxon?

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Or, first of all, does the TPP -- is it over? After that month, after it's signed, is it over? After three months, is Saxon in breach if it asks for something at Month Eight, and then it says, "Well, you didn't send it. You're out"? That -- you have to decide what the TPP means first, before you can even reach that question.

So, you know, for that 9 percent, I think there's clearly issues that are going to flow out of the Court's singular interpretation of the TPP and what it means; and that these different reasons that Saxon's presenting for denying modifications will help frame all of these issues, and help the Court make all of the necessary interpretations of the TPP for the class; but it's all going to be a single document. It's still the single TPP that has a single meaning.

And at that point, there may be some people who are not entitled to relief, for one reason or another. And we'll look at that as a matter of general proof through this data; but right now, we're talking 90 percent of the class, who, under plaintiff's theory of the case, none of the reasons matter; another 9 percent where may or may not matter.

There's this issue --

1 **THE COURT:** Let's talk about remedy. MR. FREDMAN: Yes. The most obvious remedy is 2 3 restitution. And I realize that's controversial, but in going 4 over --THE COURT: And you mean of late fees? 5 6 MR. FREDMAN: Certainly of late fees, as a 7 contractual remedy; but of TPP payments. If the TPP was deceptive, and it violated the Rosenthal Act --8 9 THE COURT: Yes. MR. FREDMAN: -- then they continued making payments, 10 11 based on an unlawful document -- as the result of an unlawful document, and those payments are subject to restitution -- the 12 same would be true for UCL fraud; fraud prong -- the same --13 the same concept is raised with respect to the idea that we are 14 15 entitled to --THE COURT: Actually, I'm not sure I would agree with 16 you, but I also am not sure that I need to decide that today. 17 In other words, the reason I asked what all of the remedies 18 were is so that I can include that in how I think about this 19 case under Rule 23; and that is, "Is the remedy that you think 2.0 people are entitled to feasible on a classwide basis, and are 21 there, kind of, case-management concerns?" and not, "Do I think 22 they're legally entitled to it?" 23 The question of restitution of TPP payments is interesting, 24

because it begs the question of, you know, what is the

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What is the change in position that I typically reliance. think of as being the basis for some kind of relief? 2 Presumably, an applicant was paying more per month than 3 4 they were under the TPP. Certainly, they weren't paying less. 5 And so the idea that they are made worse off by making these 6 TPP payments -- oh, there was a deceptive communication, so 7 they made these TPP payments. Well, what would they have made? They were under an obligation to make their monthly mortgage 8 9 payment. But I'm bending your ear about something that I don't know 10 that I need to decide today. 11 MR. FREDMAN: That's a variation on the preëxisting 12 13 debt question, which is a predominant common question, if -because they weren't making -- you know, their decision to 14 actually send the money definite -- send this money happened as 15 a result of this TPP. 16 17 THE COURT: I don't think, by the way, that that's the same thing as the consideration point that the defendants 18 make. I think that's totally different. I'm thinking that 19 20 might be where you're going. MR. FREDMAN: So we start off with: The most obvious 21 remedy is Rosenthal statutory damages. 22 There's restitution, through the rescission mechanism. 23 And -- and, very briefly, again, it's a common question, 24

but rescission -- whether rescission depends on return of some

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consideration depends on the Court's interpretation of the document and what the consideration was.

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They're trying to say the consideration was the discount; but there really was no discount for these class members. They didn't -- their mortgage obligation stayed the same. They still owed the money.

So there's various methods to get at restitution. The UCL is probably the most straightforward, under California law. We know -- I understand the issues around that, but it's certainly a very common question that predominates.

There's -- that's how I see this case going, is probably cross-motions for summary judgment on those issues. And then if no restitution is available, then we need to start looking at contract damages. There's certainly the late fees. And there may be other more individualized damages that we need to take a look at, at that point.

I think the law is clear -- and increasingly clear in this Circuit -- that the need for individualized damage computations, itself, is not going to upset class certification; and certainly not at this point, where there is no present need for those individualized calculations.

There's -- you know, we -- the Court's obviously going to manage this case as it sees fit. And we can get past that first threshold of determining whether restitution is available before we address what other remedies are available and whether

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there is a breach of a contract, before we can address whether there is -- what other particular remedies there might be, and how to manage them. THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Fredman. Ms. Abou-Rahme, am I pronouncing your name correctly? MS. ABOU-RAHME: That's correct. THE COURT: Thank you. MS. ABOU-RAHME: Thank you, Your Honor. May it please the Court. Your Honor said you read the papers and the briefs, so I would like to focus my time, instead, on addressing some of the concerns you raised before Mr. Fredman spoke, as well as some of the points Mr. Fredman raised in the reply brief; but if Your Honor has any specific questions for me, please let me know. I guess if I could take a minute to just put in this in context -- I know I only have ten -- but understand what is actually happening here, and what Ms. Gaudin is really saying; what the plaintiff here is saying. This was a Department of Treasury program. It was directed by the Department of Treasury. Saxon signed a contract with the Department of Treasury that required it to abide by the Department of Treasury's directives, criteria, and guidelines. Saxon did not have discretion on any of the facts that are

relevant to this case. Whether somebody qualified or didn't

qualify was up to the Department of Treasury.

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And what plaintiff is really saying is: Even though it was the Department of Treasury that specified the eligibility rules, she wants to hold Saxon responsible if those rules don't produce the outcome she and others may have wanted. In fact, she's asking this Court to find Saxon responsible, because she believes that the Treasury's form of notice, which is what the TPP is, was inherently deceptive. This is a classic case of shooting the messenger. And the law doesn't permit that, particularly as a class action.

But I want to address the points Your Honor raised; and commonality being one of the key ones. I think Your Honor is absolutely right that the only common question that I have seen in any of plaintiff's briefs is whether the contract -- whether the TPP is an enforceable contract; and if so, how you interpret its various provisions. And that's simply not enough, because you don't certify a class to decide if something is a contract. You certify a class to determine liability.

And issues are sometimes certified by issue if it's, you know, we'll certify a class as to breach of contract, or we'll certify as to liability and split up damages. I've never seen in any cases I've read a class certified as to one element of one cause of action, which is what this is really all about. All it gets you is: Is this a contract?

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If it's a contract -- I mean, even if we assume for these purposes that it's a contract that promised permanent modification, there is no way to avoid the individual inquiry that would be required, which is: Was the contract breached? Plaintiff doesn't deny that there are conditions. Your Honor recognized conditions on the face of the TPP that have to be met. The only way to answer if there was a breach is to look at every one of these borrowers, and see. Did they fulfill every one of these conditions; and if not, what was the reason? THE COURT: You're referring to the TPP -- the six conditions outlined in the TPP, itself; not the other requirements that you argue might have been necessary to receive a modification? Or are you --MS. ABOU-RAHME: Correct, Your Honor, except it's not just in Section 1; it's in Section 2, as well. And if --I brought the TPP up with me, which I believe -- here we In Section 3 of the TPP it actually says -- and plaintiff

I brought the TPP up with me, which I believe -- here we go. In Section 3 of the TPP it actually says -- and plaintiff quoted this in his brief -- "If I comply with the requirements in Section 2, and my representations in Section 1 continue to be true." So it's not just the representations in Section 1, but there are requirements in Section 2, which are beyond making the three payments. They go A through G.

So I am limiting, for purposes of this discussion, to the

TPP, itself; although I would like to note that in plaintiff's

First Amended Complaint, plaintiff recognizes requirements beyond the TPP. Paragraph 1 of plaintiff's First Amended 2 3 Complaint recognizes that this HAMP was an income-based 4 In paragraph 2 and paragraph 19, plaintiff recognizes 5 that she had to have made her three monthly payments, "and 6 satisfied various other requirements under the objective HAMP 7 guidelines, " I believe, is the quote. Elsewhere in the Complaint -- in 51(c), I believe -- he 8 9 refers to it as "the uniform HAMP guidelines." So -- but 10 that's an aside. So I think plaintiff has admitted there are requirements 11 beyond the TPP in the Complaint, even though, for purposes of 12 13 its class-certification motion, they've steered away from that; but even if we go with their new version that it's just the 14 TPP, that --15 THE COURT: Judge Seeborg has had something to say 16 about this, also. 17 18 MS. ABOU-RAHME: Correct. 19 **THE COURT:** This question. MS. ABOU-RAHME: Judge Seeborg recognized that there 20 are contract conditions on a very face of the TPP that have to 21 be met, and that it, by no means, on its own, was promising a 22 23 permanent modification. 24 And I think the -- excuse me, Your Honor. I think the

issue with the 9 percent, just to go for a minute to the class

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size -- the 9 percent -- and this is our failing, I'm sure; but the declaration that Ms. Monsivais submitted, where -- from which plaintiff got this, you know, 10 percent fit into one or the other category -- this was, by no means, an exclusive list. It doesn't mean that the other 90 percent of the class had no reason.

And she explains in her declaration, Saxon was required to give Treasury our report. And by looking at that report, there were these easy buckets. And these were sort of examples of hundreds of people or nine people or however many it was in various of these buckets; but you would still have to look at every individual to see what other reason there was, and whether that was a legitimate reason under the TPP, or not.

And, in fact, the conversation with Mr. Fredman earlier proves plaintiff's point -- proves defendant's point that it's -- there is no way to get around the individual inquiry. I mean, you have to look at: Did this person live in the property? Did this person give the deed that was required?

And the other issue about the reports -- I know Mr. Fredman likes to say that these are all readily available in Saxon's computers, but this --

THE COURT: I'm not going to say this exactly in the right way. It's going to be inartful, but hopefully I can communicate the essence of the question. Let's say that the Court were to certify a class of persons who signed the TPP,

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probably am.

submitted the required information, made three payments, got a signed TPP back from Saxon, and were not deemed to have violated any of the conditions contained in Section 1 or 2. Now, I don't know whether there would be anybody left, but -- and I'm not saying that that's your proposal. understand that you think that that would not be a certifiable class; but if I did do that, wouldn't it obviate the problem that you're now describing? MS. ABOU-RAHME: It wouldn't, Your Honor, only because the only way to figure out what that remaining bucket is, is by looking at each individual file. These -- the reasons that were given in Ms. Monsivais' declaration -- the requirement by Treasury was to give a reason for denial. It did not require them to give all of the reasons for denial, and it did not require them to correct the reason for denial if there was an error. For example, in Ms. Gaudin's case, it was reported as, "Did not make her trial payments," which was an error that was It wasn't corrected in this record. So these corrected. numbers in this declaration is what was reported to Treasury, based on the information available when they reported it, and based on what was required. So for --THE COURT: I hope I'm not stating the obvious, but I

I gather that everybody in the proposed class, as

you understand it to be framed, did have a modification denial?

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MS. ABOU-RAHME: Everybody in the proposed class had a modification denial, except for some, who -- who refused a modification. So it includes people -- it's everyone who did not get a modification, whether it's because they were denied, or because they found some other alternative.

But Your Honor, if I can get back to your question, even if someone signed a TPP, made three payments, and were not deemed to have violated any of the conditions of the TPP, then you get into the problem of the ascertainable class, because to identify those individuals, you would have to look at every loan file for every one of the 2,700-some individuals to see if anyone even fits in with that. So that would be Step 1.

And Step 2 would still be that you can't get away from the individualized proof. Even if you get to, let's say, ten people who did not violate something in the TPP, but violated something in the HAMP objectives or the guidelines, and the Court decides that those are not relevant, then you still can't get around the damages issue.

And I'd like to address that for a second, if I may, because I know that damages, themselves, are not -- do not preclude class certification; but they do require, especially after *Comcast*, that the plaintiff be able to identify how the plaintiff class was damaged as a result of the conduct, and whether those damages can be determined on a classwide basis, without looking at each individual's individual circumstances.

And there's no way that can be done here.

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And even the cases that plaintiff cites where they say damages can be a separate inquiry, there is still at least a method by which the damages can be calculated. There's either some kind of a formula, or there's a mechanical way in which to do it. And plaintiff hasn't offered anything here that works.

The return of TPP payments, leaving aside the problem of the preëxisting debt -- the return -- you can't just return the money, without seeing what the damages were. I mean, this is not -- they have to have shown how they were damaged.

For example, if somebody who made TPP payments for six months beyond the three months -- during those six months, you have to look at what benefit they got from those reduced payments. Were they able to pay down a credit-card bill? Were they able to avoid losing their car?

There are many short-term benefits that you'd have to look at -- were they able to stay in their home longer than they otherwise would have? -- that you would have to look at before you decide what they are entitled to receive in return.

In other words, even if you ignore the preëxisting debt, it's not just a matter of: Here's your money. It's: Well, what did you benefit from when you were paying the reduced payments? And you have to take all of that into account.

And Mr. Fredman -- you know, they didn't submit an expert report, which we did, which really talks to how particularized

the damages issue is in this case.

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So have I answered your question, Your Honor?

THE COURT: I think you have. I actually need to ask you to wrap up. I have some people waiting patiently in the back of the courtroom who, I'm sure, are really anxious.

MS. ABOU-RAHME: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

Just the last thing I want to say about damages is the Rosenthal Act; the statutory damages. To me, that's a red herring. That is a cap on the amount of damages plaintiffs may collectively receive. It doesn't mean they're automatically entitled to \$500,000 if there's a violation of the Rosenthal Act.

And the last point I would like to make is: The individualized issues pervade not just the breach-of-contract claims, but also the Rosenthal Act and the UCL, for the following reasons.

If you're going to look at what -- for Rosenthal Act, the least-sophisticated investor -- how he would have interpreted the TPP, you have to look at the whole picture. And the whole picture is the TPP, with the letter, with the phone calls they all had before they got the letters, with the communications that each of them subsequently had with Saxon, which were numerous. There's -- you don't just look at the contract. If we're talking about Rosenthal Act and if we're talking about the UCL, you have to look at the complete picture. And there's

no way to look at the complete picture here, without looking at each individual's circumstances. 2 And I think not only do Wal-Mart and Comcast require a 3 4 denial in this case, but the Ninth Circuit decision in Wang 5 versus Daily News --6 (Reporter requests clarification.) 7 MS. ABOU-RAHME: Wang versus Daily News. And the District Court has several decisions -- in Campion, 8 9 in Hanni, and in Faulk -- that all go to the fact of -- in UCL, 10 in breach of contract. And then there's a decision, O'Donovan --11 THE COURT: Ms. Abou-Rahme, I don't want you to sit 12 down now, but I'm going to ask you to, anyway. 13 MS. ABOU-RAHME: Thank you, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Thank you. 15 Mr. Fredman, in three sentences, tell me why Ms. Abou-Rahme 16 is wrong with her point that the list that's in your brief of 17 the various reasons why some people didn't get modifications is 18 not a complete list, and so just determining whether there was 19 individual compliance with the TPP requirements, themselves, 2.0 will require a file-by-file examination. Tell me why that's 21 22 wronq. 23 MR. FREDMAN: Their statement that they can give the 24 wrong reason to Treasury for denying a modification is pretty 25 suspect.

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THE COURT: That isn't the question I asked you, so I'm going to ask it again, because our time is short. MR. FREDMAN: Yes. THE COURT: And if I've misunderstood your opponent's argument, or her argument's not based on the law, tell me that; but I think what I said was a little different. I heard your opponent to say that, even limiting the question to the four corners of the TPP, as you're asking the Court to do, that there were more requirements than simply filling out the form, sending in the information, and signing it, and getting a signed TPP back; that there were more things that people had to do, under the Treasury program. And if that's right, then, in order to determine whether the defendants violated anybody's rights, you'd have to go through each file to just see: Did they comply with the TPP requirements, or was the denial based on something else? And my question for you is: Are they incorrect in their construction of the TPP when they say, "No. There were other things that individual borrowers had to do, which were a

legitimate basis for denial"?

And maybe they were incorrect, and that's the end of the inquiry.

Or if they're not incorrect, why wouldn't the decider in the case have to go through each file individually?

> I understand. MR. FREDMAN:

1 Were there other qualifications to get into the HAMP program, so that Saxon could get its subsidy? 2 3 Yes. 4 Inside the TPP, were there other conditions? 5 No, in terms of: There were no other conditions, than the 6 ones we've described. And they're on the face of the TPP. 7 In terms of the idea that she said, well, maybe this list we've given incomplete; we could have had other reasons -- and 8 9 if they want to go give those other reasons, just like they gave these reasons, that's fine. 10 And that doesn't preclude class certification: The fact 11 that they have to figure out what other reasons they might have 12 13 had that they didn't list for denying the modification, if I understand that correctly. 14 They've given -- in other words, for every single person, 15 they've given the reason they denied it. And they don't 16 matter. And they're saying there might be other reasons we 17 denied modification. 18 If that's the case, that's evidence. And they can --19 **THE COURT:** Your belief is that when somebody 2.0 21 executed the TPP -- when they signed it -- and they submitted the information that was required, if they got it back signed, 22 23 at that moment Saxon was obligated to give them a loan 24 modification. True?

If they made the three payments.

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MR. FREDMAN:

That's exactly what the TPP says. 2 THE COURT: I think that may be where the parties disagree on this. 3 I'm enjoying this hearing very much, but unfortunately --4 and the briefing. May I just say the briefing on both sides 5 was quite good, really. And I wish you were the only thing on 6 7 the calendar, but you're not. MR. FREDMAN: Thank you. 8 9 THE COURT: So I'm going to take this under 10 submission. Thank you. 11 (At 3:48 p.m. the proceedings were adjourned.) 12 I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the 13 record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 14 15 Court Reporter/Transcriber Date 16 Lydia Zinn 17 18 19 2.0 21 22 23 24 25